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ABSTRACT 
Covert channels in modern communication networks are a 
source of security concerns. Such channels can be used to 
facilitate command and control of botnets or inject 
malicious contents into unsuspected end-user devices or 
network nodes. The vast majority of the documented covert 
channels make use of the upper layers of the Open Systems 
Interconnection (OSI) model. In this thesis, we present a 
new covert channel in IEEE 802.11 networks, making use of 
the Protocol Version field in the Medium Access Control 
(MAC) header. This is achieved by forging modified Clear To 
Send (CTS) and Acknowledgment (ACK) frames. Forward error 
correction mechanisms and interleaving were implemented to 
increase the proposed channel's robustness to error. A 
laboratory implementation of the proposed channel is 
presented by developing the necessary code in Python, 
operating in a Linux environment. We present the results of 
tests conducted on the proposed channel, including 
measurements of channel errors, available data rate for 
transmission, and level of covertness.  
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IEEE 802.11, also known as WiFi, is one of the most widely 
used set of standards in today’s wireless network 
communications. It is present in a wide variety of 
electronic equipment, from smartphones and laptops to 
kitchen appliances and automobiles. According to an 
industry report, in 2012 over one billion devices will be 
shipped with technology based on this standard onboard, and 
the number is projected to be over two billion in 2014. The 
technical capabilities and the mobility provided to the 
user make it one of the most successful wireless networking 
systems. 
As in any other type of network communication 
standard, security plays a key role. Mobility and ease of 
access are attractive characteristics to the end users, but 
along with them come additional security concerns. It is 
important to evaluate the possible weaknesses and 
vulnerabilities of a standard in order to determine 
relevant security challenges. The particular focus in this 
work is covert channels, which have the characteristic of 
being hard to detect unless we know in advance what we are 
looking for. 
Covert channels come up as one of many aspects 
involved in the security evaluation of a standard and can 
pose a threat to the unaware user. A covert channel is a 
method to transmit information using the communication 




the developers. Such covert channels can be used to 
exfiltrate information from the user’s device, propagate 
malware or control a botnet. 
The objectives of this thesis were to identify, 
implement and test a proof-of-concept covert channel in 
IEEE 802.11 networks. This was achieved by forging control 
frames and exploiting specific bits in the Medium Access 
Control (MAC) header. 
In this thesis, we developed the necessary code to 
implement the proposed covert channel, conducted laboratory 
experiments, and measured and analyzed the results. 
Operational IEEE 802.11 networks were monitored prior to 
designing the proposed covert channel, allowing us to 
gather enough information to make a sound decision on which 
frames to forge and how to manipulate them. In order to 
improve the error performance of the proposed covert 
channel, several techniques were used, such as 
convolutional coding and bit interleaving. Detectability 
and mitigation techniques were also addressed, as well as a 
throughput analysis. 
Ideas for future work include optimization of the 
channel throughput, increasing the channel’s robustness to 
errors and exploring the proposed covert channel concept in 
other emerging wireless standards, such as IEEE 802.16 






I. INTRODUCTION  
As wireless networks become more ubiquitous, so do our 
dependencies on them. In a relatively short period, day-to-
day use of wireless networks and mobile devices have become 
a large part of our modern-day lives. This trend is likely 
to continue in the coming years, regardless of the specific 
technologies. Mobility and ease of access are very 
attractive characteristics to the end users, but along with 
them come additional security concerns [1,2]. 
One security-related issue associated with 
communication networks, wired or wireless, is the concept 
of a covert channel, which takes advantage of the very 
fabric of communication networks and exploits them in a way 
that allows the communication protocols to become the 
unintended carrier of messages. This idea of network covert 
channels was documented 25 years ago by Girling [3]. 
However, the concept of a system-based covert channel was 
initially presented by Lampson in 1973 [4]. Extensive 
progress has been made in protocol design since then, but 
covert channels are still a security concern. It becomes 
difficult to account for the existence of every possible 
variation of these channels. 
According to the Department of Defense (DoD) Trusted 
Computer System Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC), a covert 
channel is defined as “any communication channel that can 
be exploited by a process to transfer information in a 
manner that violates the system’s security policy [5].” 
This means a protocol may be used in a way that was not 
intended or anticipated by the designers. 
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As networks and respective protocols have evolved and 
changed, so have the documented covert channels. A search 
for possible covert channels begins every time a new 
protocol is implemented or an existing one is modified.  
A new covert channel embedded in the Medium Access 
Control (MAC) layer of an IEEE 802.11-2007 [6] wireless 
network is presented and explored in this thesis. 
A. MOTIVATION 
Over the last decade, wireless communications has 
played a key role in user mobility, a much appreciated 
benefit of such technology. On the other hand, wireless 
access and user mobility pose security challenges due to 
underlying vulnerabilities associated with covert channels 
and other weaknesses. 
In order to protect wireless networks from being 
exploited, we need to constantly evaluate their 
vulnerabilities and devise techniques to mitigate them. 
Finding possible covert channels presents an ongoing 
challenge, and the possible uses for such channels range 
from well-intentioned authentication mechanisms [7], to 
malware propagation [8], exfiltration [8,9] or command and 
control of botnets [10]. 
The above gives us enough reason to ask ourselves, 
What can be worse than not being able to decipher the 
contents of an unwanted communication? Our answer would be 
not knowing such a communication is even taking place. The 
power contained in covert channels is that they have the 
possibility of being in operation long before they are 
detected and identified as channels.  The ability to 
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communicate in this manner gives the user who knows of the 
covert channel a tool that could be used in either a benign 
or malicious manner. 
Although most networks today are protected by 
intrusion detection systems (IDS) and/or intrusion 
prevention systems (IPS), an undocumented covert channel 
can be in operation without triggering an alarm [8]. The 
key factor is that these covert channels are being operated 
in the background, making it extremely hard to protect a 
network against an unknown covert channel.  The importance 
of investigating as many covert channels as possible should 
be obvious, as each networking standard has its own unique 
characteristics to exploit. For this reason, it is 
generally accepted that covert channels cannot be 
completely eliminated because of numerous variations in 
their implementation [11,12]. 
B. OBJECTIVE 
The objective of this thesis is to identify, implement 
and test a proof-of-concept covert channel in an IEEE 
802.11-2007 network environment. The purposed covert 
channel will use the MAC header of control frames to hide 
the covert information. This will be achieved by forging 
frames that use the protocol version bits in a way that was 
not intended by the designers of the IEEE 802.11 standard. 
The proposed channel will be implemented using the 
Python [13] programming language in a Linux environment. A 
graphical user interface (GUI) that resembles a typical 
chat room window will be used. Tests will be conducted over 
an operational network under different conditions. Matlab 
will be used for analyzing the measurements from the tests. 
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To increase the proposed channel's robustness to errors, 
forward error correction and bit interleaving techniques 
will be used. 
C. RELATED WORK 
Many covert channels have been documented over the 
years and reflect the technological stage of the networks 
at which they were documented. As networking technologies 
evolve, so do the corresponding protocols and their 
complexity. With the release of each new networking 
standard, such complexity opens the door for new covert 
channels, which makes the research in covert channels 
challenging. 
The vast majority of academic research has focused on 
documenting covert channels in layer 3 or above of the Open 
Systems Interconnection (OSI) model, partly neglecting 
layers 1 and 2 [14]. These types of covert channels based 
on higher layer protocols span a wider variety of networks, 
since they are not limited by the physical or medium access 
mechanisms. The two most explored protocols above layer 2 
are IP and TCP [12,15,16]. Even higher layer protocols, 
such as Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP), HyperText 
Transfer Protocol (HTTP) or Domain Name System (DNS), have 
several documented covert channels [14,17,18]. 
More recently, researchers began investigating 
wireless networks, specifically identifying covert channels 
in the MAC layer [19,20,21,22]. Frame forging plays a key 
role in this type of covert channel. Creating fake frames 
with modified header bits is a recurring theme to implement 
such channels. MAC header fields such as the sequence 
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number [21], initialization vector [21] or destination 
address [22], have been used to hide the covert 
information. 
Our work differs from the techniques reported in the 
literature. In the proposed covert channel, a different MAC 
header field is used: the protocol version field. Our work 
also addresses the error robustness and throughput 
analysis, supported by extensive experimental results. 
D. ORGANIZATION 
An overview of the IEEE 802.11-2007 standard is 
presented in Chapter II. The 802.11 data link layer and the 
different types of MAC frames are discussed. An overview of 
covert channels and a formal classification are provided. 
In Chapter III, the formulation and design of the proposed 
covert channel based on empirical foundations are 
presented. A large volume of data is collected and analyzed 
in support of the covert channel formulation.  
An implementation of the proposed channel is presented 
in Chapter IV. We describe the code along with the 
different test scenarios and experimental setups. An 
exhaustive analysis of the results is contained in this 
chapter, including the measurements of channel errors, 
available throughput, and the level of covertness. Use of 
forward error correction (FEC) and interleaving to improve 
the channel performance are discussed. 
Chapter V includes conclusions and recommendations for 
future work. The required steps to launch the proposed 
covert channel are detailed in Appendix A, and the Python 
code used to implement it is given in Appendix B. 
 6
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II. BACKGROUND 
In this chapter, we present the basic IEEE 802.11-2007 
architectures, types of frames of interest, and an overview 
of covert channels. 
A. OVERVIEW OF IEEE 802.11 
1. Protocol Architecture 
The IEEE 802.11-based wireless nodes share a common 
medium for communication. The 802.11 protocol architecture 
can be seen in Figure 1. It addresses the user access at 
layers 1 and 2 of the OSI model, i.e., the physical and the 
data link layer, respectively. 
 
OSI MODEL  IEEE 802 MODEL 
Data Link 
Layer 
 802.2 Logical Link Control (LLC) 









Figure 1.   OSI model compared to IEEE 802 protocol 
architecture. 
The logical link control (LLC) acts as a uniform 
interface between the upper layer and the MAC layer. This 
enables the network layer to operate normally regardless of 
the type of MAC being implemented, i.e., for the same LLC, 
different MAC options are possible. 
The medium access control enables the use of a shared 
medium among several stations. Following the same concept 
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as before, we see that for the same MAC, different 
variations of the physical layer can be used. In order to 
regulate the access to the physical layer, 802.11 makes use 
of the carrier sense multiple access with collision 
avoidance (CSMA/CA) scheme [6]. This scheme was developed 
to avoid collisions due to simultaneous transmissions. Such 
collisions cause frame loss, reduce the network's 
throughput and increase delay. 
The physical layer enables the transmission of 
information in the form of electromagnetic signals through 
the use of different modulation schemes, frequency 
spreading techniques, multiplexing, etc. As we can see from 
Figure 1, different types of physical layer technologies 
were incorporated into the 802.11 standard. 
It is important to mention that different versions of 
the 802.11 protocol are available. These versions differ 
mainly in the physical layer. The frequency band and bit 
rate differences among the most common versions are 
summarized in Table 1. Note that 802.11a, b and g are 
incorporated in the IEEE 802.11-2007 version of the 
standard [6]. The 802.11b version is the subject of all the 












Maximum bit rate 
(Mbps) 
802.11-1997 2.4 2 
802.11a 5 54 
802.11b 2.4 11 
802.11g 2.4 54 
802.11n 2.4 and/or 5 600 
 
2. Network Architecture 
The fundamental building block of the 802.11 
architecture is called the basic service set (BSS). One BSS 
may be connected to other BSSs via a distribution system 
(DS). Within this framework, stations can connect in ad-hoc 
mode or infrastructure mode. The simpler case is ad-hoc 
mode, where two stations can connect directly, point to 
point, without a DS and an access point (AP). Although 
convenient, the ad-hoc mode of operation does not support 
some functions, such as power save. 
If we have the stations connecting via an AP and 
making use of a DS, then we say they are setup in 
infrastructure mode. A wider range of functions and control 
mechanisms are possible in this mode, along with 
centralized security management and extended reach. This 
type of setup is adequate when we want our wireless network 
to connect to an existing Ethernet network or other 
wireless networks in the vicinity, making use of the AP's 
wider range. An example of such a setup can be seen in 
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Figure 2. Here, we can see BSS1 being actively protected by 
a firewall and passively monitored by an Intrusion 
Detection System (IDS). 
 
 
Figure 2.   Example of an 802.11 network in 
infrastructure mode. 
B. 802.11 MAC FRAME  
1. Header Format 
In Figure 3, we can see the generic MAC format for an 
802.11 MAC frame. The frame consists of the MAC header, the 
frame body and the frame check sequence (FCS).  
 11
 
Figure 3.   MAC frame format [From 6]. 
The first field in the MAC header is the frame control 
(FC), and consists of two octets. In order to better 
understand the contents and use of this field, a detailed 
view is depicted in Figure 4. 
 
 
Figure 4.   Frame control field [From 6]. 
Within the FC, the field in which we are interested is 
the first field, corresponding to the Protocol Version 
(PV). The PV field consists of two bits that specify the 
version number of the 802.11 protocol being used. As of 
this writing, PV is expected to be set to zero [6]. This 
value may change in the future if a newer version of the 
standard is released.  
The protocol version is the field we will be using for 
the proposed covert channel. We utilize the remaining three 
possible combinations of the PV field to hide the covert 
information. 
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2. Frame Types of Interest 
Four types of frames exist in the 802.11 protocol, as 
listed in Table 2. We have the management, data, reserved 
and control frames. 
The management frames exist to initiate, establish and 
maintain the communication between stations. Examples of 
management frames can be seen in the subtype column of 
Table 2. Frames responsible for association, 
disassociation, authentication and beaconing are part of 
this type. These frames are not very common and for that 
reason not very interesting for our research. 
Data frames are the ones that carry the information 
and can also provide some services, such as quality of 
service (QoS). 
The reserved frames have no specific task, they are 
just a type of frames not currently assigned by the 
standard to perform a specific task. 
The last type of frame is the control type. These 
facilitate the exchange of data frames between stations. 
Within the existing control subtypes, we are interested in 
the smaller sized frames, the acknowledgement (ACK) and the 
clear to send (CTS).  
a. Clear to Send/ Request to Send 
The IEEE 802.11 MAC layer makes use of the 
CSMA/CA scheme in order to minimize the number of 
collisions and subsequent frame loss. This is a way to 
force the transmitting station to sense the medium, hold 
its transmissions until the medium is free, and transmit if 
the media is not in use.  
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Sometimes, a transmitting station may not be in 
range of another transmitting station and might sense the 
medium as free when in fact the medium is being used. A 
third station, in range of the previous two, will receive 
both signals simultaneously, sensing a collision. This is 
known as the hidden node problem [24]. To address this 
issue, a RTS/CTS handshake mechanism is used. This is done 
every time a station has information to transmit, making 
these kind of frames very common.  
The CTS is a 14-byte long frame, whereas the RTS 
is 20 bytes long. 
b. Acknowledgment 
This type of frame is generated when a station 
correctly receives a packet, and it is intended to signal 
the source station that the reception was successful. For 
this reason, this type of frame also tends to be very 
common in an operational wireless network. The length of 
this frame is the same as the CTS, 14 bytes. 
The format of the CTS frame, as well as the ACK 
frame, is shown in Figure 5. Both frames share the same 
format and only differ in one bit in the subtype field 
within the frame control, as seen in Table 2. The ACK frame 
has the subtype value set to 1101; the CTS sets it to 1100. 
 
 
Figure 5.   ACK and CTS frame format [From 6]. 
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00 Management 0000 Association request
00 Management 0001 Association response 
00 Management 0010 Reassociation request 
00 Management 0011 Reassociation response 
00 Management 0100 Probe request 
00 Management 0101 Probe response 
00 Management 0110–0111 Reserved 
00 Management 1000 Beacon 
00 Management 1001 ATIM 
00 Management 1010 Disassociation 
00 Management 1011 Authentication 
00 Management 1100 Deauthentication 
00 Management 1101 Action 
00 Management 1110–1111 Reserved 
01 Control 0000–0111 Reserved 
01 Control 1000 Block Ack Request (BlockAckReq) 
01 Control 1001 Block Ack (BlockAck) 
01 Control 1010 PS-Poll 
01 Control 1011 RTS 
01 Control 1100 CTS 
01 Control 1101 ACK 
01 Control 1110 CF-End 
01 Control 1111 CF-End + CF-Ack 
10 Data 0000 Data 
10 Data 0001 Data + CF-Ack 
10 Data 0010 Data + CF-Poll 
10 Data 0011 Data + CF-Ack + CF-Poll 
10 Data 0100 Null (no data) 
10 Data 0101 CF-Ack (no data) 
10 Data 0110 CF-Poll (no data) 
10 Data 0111 CF-Ack + CF-Poll (no data) 
10 Data 1000 QoS Data 
10 Data 1001 QoS Data + CF-Ack 
10 Data 1010 QoS Data + CF-Poll 
10 Data 1011 QoS Data + CF-Ack + CF-Poll 
10 Data 1100 QoS Null (no data) 
10 Data 1101 Reserved 
10 Data 1110 QoS CF-Poll (no data) 
10 Data 1111 QoS CF-Ack + CF-Poll (no data) 
11 Reserved 0000–1111 Reserved 
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We will focus on ACK and CTS frames, since they 
are small in size and tend to be large in volume. As a 
result, if we use them for covert communications, it is 
difficult to be noticed by monitoring devices such as 
firewalls and IDSs. The volume of these frames is 
experimentally verified in Chapter III.  
C. COVERT CHANNELS AND RELATED WORK 
We presented a definition of covert channels in 
Chapter I, and we now will look at the different types of 
channels reported in the literature. 
1. Types of Covert Channels 
In his 1987 paper, Girling [3] identified two major 
types of covert channels: storage and timing. The storage 
covert channels make use of protocols or other mechanisms 
to write additional information in a way that was not 
intended, whereas the timing channels signal information 
between processes by means of varying delays and changing 
the timing of events [5]. The first type tends to be easier 
to implement and is the most common. Based on this, the 
proposed channel in this thesis is a storage channel. 
2. Related Work 
The work of Frikha et al. [21] was the starting point 
for this project, inspiring the proposed covert channel 
configuration. In Frikha's paper, two implementations of a 
covert channel are presented, both using fields in the 
802.11 MAC header. The first uses the eight most 
significant bits of the sequence control field. This field 
has a length of two bytes, which is subdivided into two 
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subfields. The first subfield is the sequence number and 
comprises the first 12 bits. The following four bits 
represent the fragment number.  By using the eight most 
significant bits of the sequence number subfield, their 
covert channel achieves a throughput of one byte per frame. 
The second implementation in [21] applies to networks 
where Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) is in use. If this is 
the case, the initialization vector subfield is used to 
carry the covert message. This technique allows a 
throughput of three bytes per frame. 
Another covert channel proposed by Butti [22] uses a 
part of the destination address field of ACK frames to hide 
the payload. A throughput of one byte per frame is achieved 
in this case. Butti [22] also presents complete code for 
the channel's implementation. 
Each of these approaches relies on the forging of 
frames by manipulating the contents of the MAC header in 
order to hide the covert information.   
D. CONCEPT OF THE PROPOSED COVERT CHANNEL 
In this thesis, we propose a MAC layer storage covert 
channel that would ideally work in an environment as 
illustrated in Figure 6. This figure represents two 
stations embedded in an 802.11 infrastructure network but 
at the same time exchanging information through the use of 
a covert channel. This is the ultimate goal of our 
research, although it was not fully achieved.  
An alternative configuration as described in Chapter 
IV, in which the covert channel and an Ethernet connection 
were in use simultaneously, through the use of two network 
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adapters, was successfully implemented. The reason for 
implementing a simplified channel is related to the 
limitations presented by the available hardware. We only 
had one wireless network card adapter in each station, and 
for the covert channel to be functional, that card had to 
be set to Monitor mode. This mode does not allow a 
simultaneous connection to the infrastructure network. One 
possible solution would be installing a second wireless 




Figure 6.   Network topology in which the covert channel 
operates. 
Once the covert channel is established, the robustness 
of the channel becomes relevant. The error performance of 
the channel depends on the network traffic and potential 
collisions and loss of frames. To ensure the proposed 
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channel has some degree of resilience to transmission 
errors, the use of forward error correction (FEC) and 
interleaving was considered and tested. A convolutional 
code of rate 23 and constraint length of four was employed. 
In summary, this chapter provided an overview of the 
IEEE 802.11-2007 standard, protocol and network 
architectures, frame construction and most common frame 
types. A classification of covert channels and existing 
work on covert channels related to our work were presented. 
A conceptual description of the proposed covert channel was 
provided. 
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III. DESIGNING THE COVERT CHANNEL 
A covert channel can be used as a means to convey 
information without other parties realizing that there is a 
hidden communication taking place. In this thesis we 
investigate the implementation of a covert channel in an 
IEEE 802.11-2007 wireless network. 
An overview of different covert channels and the 
architecture, as well as some frame formats of the IEEE 
802.11-2007 standard were covered in Chapter III. A new 
covert channel that utilizes specific bits in the MAC 
header of an 802.11 network is presented in this chapter, 
and the problem of implementing a functional covert channel 
is addressed. 
A. NETWORK MONITORING 
In the previous chapter we discussed the various types 
of frames in 802.11 networks. For the construction of the 
proposed covert channel, we examine these frames to 
identify one or more fields in the MAC header that are 
suitable for information transfer. In order to do so, we 
must first choose the type of frame suitable for this 
purpose. The necessary analysis to make a sound decision is 
provided in the following section. 
1. Type of Frame Analysis 
A heavily used 802.11 network on campus is monitored 
to collect frame traffic on multiple channels. The network 
channels monitored were channel 1 and channel 9. From the 
MAC frame traffic collected, channel 1 is found to be the 
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one with most traffic volume and number of users. We 
collected over 22 million packets to analyze the following 
frame basic characteristics. 
The first characteristic we examined was the type of 
frame that would best suit our needs. Ideally, we want a 
frame that is short in length, common in occurrence, and 
still valid if some bits are changed. Additionally, its 
presence in bursts should not be a rare event. These 
features are desirable for achieving a reasonable 
throughput while providing covertness.  
The results of our analysis are shown in Figure 7 as a 
pie chart, which represents the frequency of occurrence of 
different types of frames. The data frames are dominant, 
followed by CTS, ACK and beacons. The "others" refers to 
the sum of all other frames that represent less than 1% 
individually. From this plot, we can clearly see that two 
types of control frames matching our needs stand out, the 
ACK and the CTS. 
 
 
Figure 7.   Frequency of occurrence of the monitored 
frame types 
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We chose to use CTS for building the proposed covert 
channel as the CTS traffic volume is large and is of same 
frame size as ACK. The next desirable characteristic of the 
frame is the burst length, i.e., the consecutive occurrence 
of the same frame type in an 802.11 wireless network under 
normal operating conditions. 
2. Sequence of Frames Analysis 
Initially, one aspect taken into consideration was the 
importance of having sequences of ACK or CTS originating 
from the same station. This became irrelevant since the 
frame does not contain a source address, and the 
destination address of the forged frame can be manipulated 
as necessary. The importance of frame sequence is relevant 
when we are concerned with the detectability of our 
channel. One could detect a rogue station by observing the 
received power level, the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of 
the received frames, and recognizing the fact that the 
frames originated from the same location [25]. Such 
analysis might work if the wireless stations are 
stationary, which defeats the purpose of mobility, but it 
may be a typical scenario for a limited time, as in an 
office space or conference room.  
In the traffic we collected, long sequences of 
consecutive frames of the same type, either ACK or CTS, 
directed to different stations were observed. The sequence 
length versus the frequency of occurrence of the ACK and 
CTS, respectively, are illustrated in Figures 8 and 9. We 
excluded any sequence length with less than two 
occurrences. For reference, a maximum length of 252 
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consecutive CTS frames was recorded once, but it was 
clearly a unique event in all of the monitored traffic.  
In Figure 8, we notice the high incidence of short 
sequences of consecutive frames (up to 10 consecutive 
frames), and lower occurrence of lengths above 40 
consecutive ACK frames. 
 
 
Figure 8.   Distribution of acknowledgement (ACK) frame 
burst length. 
From Figure 9, it is clear that CTS is more likely to 
have long consecutive sequences.  
One abnormality noticed during the traffic analysis 
was the presence of “unexpected” frames among the collected 
traffic. By unexpected, we mean that some of the captured 
frames contain a protocol version number other than zero, 
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which should be the default value [6]. The following 
section examines the protocol version field.  
 
Figure 9.   Distribution of clear to send (CTS) frame 
burst length. 
3. Protocol Version Field Analysis 
The zero value for the protocol version field is set 
by the standard, and at the time of this writing it has not 
been changed. This led us to look into it with more 
attention, since this is one potential field that can be 
used by the proposed covert channel. 
The results of traffic analysis conducted on the 
protocol version field are contained in Tables 3 to 5. From 
the traffic data collected in our experiment, we selected 
6,189,701 frames to examine the protocol version field, as 




(6,182,148 frames or 99.88%) were found to contain version 
0. Frames containing version numbers 1, 2, and 3 were very 
few in number. 
 








0 6,182,148 99.88 
1 2,880 0.05 
2 3,347 0.05 
3 1,326 0.02 
ALL  6,189,701 100 
 
 
We conducted the same analysis on the two specific 
frames of interest, the ACK and CTS frames, and the results 
are listed in Tables 4 and 5. As we can see, the incidence 
of protocol version other than zero is quite low.  








0 1,269,379 99.95 
1 288 0.02 
2 296 0.02 
3 8 0.00 
















0 2,997,890 99.99 
1 88 0.00 
2 310 0.01 
3 13 0.00 
ALL  2,998,301 100 
 
Presence of the protocol version other than 0 is 
puzzling. On the one hand, this means that the security 
mechanisms in the access point may not be performing a 
thorough analysis of the frame headers; a properly 
functioning security mechanism should block the frames with 
non-zero protocol version field. On the other hand, if we 
intended to use this field as a means for the covert 
channel, the existence of other stations transmitting a 
value other than zero would be a source of noise in the 
channel. 
To insure that frames contain non-zero version field 
are not a result of malformed, corrupted or fragmented 
packets, we further examined the frame traffic. We found 
that frames with a protocol version higher than zero 
contained mismatched frame check sums; i.e., they were 
formed due to bit errors. An example of such a frame can be 
seen in Figure 10, a Wireshark [26] capture, where we 
highlighted the version field and the failed checksum. 
4. Choosing the Frame Type 
In the process of choosing a frame for the covert 
channel, several frames were considered, such as RTS and 
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ACK. These frames could serve as well as the CTS, but they 
were found to be less frequent than CTS. Also, among these 
three frames, RTS is the longest one with 20 bytes, and the 
CTS and ACK have only 14 bytes. For this reason we narrowed 
the options to ACK and CTS. The smaller the number of bits 
we have to transmit to send a covert message, the more 
efficient the channel becomes. 
 
 
Figure 10.   Wireshark capture of a CTS frame with PV = 3 
and incorrect check sum. 
From monitoring of frame traffic on the campus 
wireless network and empirical analysis, we found that the 
CTSs occur with a frequency twice that of the ACKs. The 
monitoring was conducted in different traffic scenarios, 
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ranging from low traffic periods to high levels of 
utilization of the network. By choosing CTS, we can 
minimize the chance of causing a traffic anomaly based on 
the type and frequency of packets flowing through the 
network. Also, we already found that the presence of a long 
burst of CTS's is not uncommon in 802.11 networks. During 
frame traffic monitoring, we frequently observed long 
sequences (up to 50) of consecutive CTS's. Of course, this 
sequence length would not allow us to send that many bits 
in a row. A way around this issue is to slow down the rate 
at which we generate and transmit the forged frames. This 
would drastically reduce the throughput but would increase 
the stealthiness of our channel. 
Since CTS and ACK have a similar frame structure, it 
is easier to switch from one to the other, according to our 
objectives. The main concept of the proposed covert channel 
applies equally to both frames. It is even possible to have 
one end of the channel transmitting ACK frames and the 
other transmitting CTS frames without any loss or 
degradation of performance. Alternating frame types, such 
as transmitting a forged ACK followed by a forged CTS is 
also viable. Many other variations are also feasible. 
The fact that both CTS and ACK frames do not contain a 
source address also contributes to a higher level of 
stealthiness since it is not possible to immediately 
identify the source of the transmission. 
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B. PROPOSED COVERT CHANNEL 
1. MAC Header Manipulation 
In the proposed covert channel, we use two bits in the 
protocol version field of the MAC header of an 802.11 CTS 
packet to carry hidden information. The first two bytes in 
the MAC header is the frame control field. The generic two-
octet long frame control field with the protocol version 
field highlighted is shown in Figure 11.  
 
 
Figure 11.   Frame control field [From 6]. 
The proposed covert channel uses the protocol version 
bits in a variety of ways to signal the beginning and end 
of the transmission as well as to carry the information, 
one bit at a time. 
In order to facilitate communication in the proposed 
covert channel, we divided the transmission into three 
segments: start message delimiter, message, and end message 
delimiter. The start and end delimiters are realized by 
transmitting a sequence of five frames with 01 in the 
protocol version field. The message bits are transmitted 
using combinations of 10 as binary "0" and 11 as binary "1" 
in the protocol version field. The message is organized 
into 8-bit ASCII characters. 
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An example of this procedure is shown in Figure 12, 
where a capture of Wireshark is displayed in which we can 
see the transmission of the ASCII character “A” converted 
into the binary string “01000001.” A total of 18 frames 
were transmitted as follows: 
  five CTS frames with protocol version one (01) 
mark the beginning of the transmission; 
  eight CTS frames corresponding to the binary 
representation of the ASCII code of character 
'A', with protocol version 2 (10) representing a 
binary zero and protocol version 3 (11) a binary 
one; and 
  five CTS frames with protocol version one (01) 
marking the end of the transmission. 
 
Figure 12.   Wireshark capture of an “A” being 
transmitted using the proposed covert channel. 
2. Important MAC Header Parameters 
It is important to keep the forged frame as a valid 
frame to minimize the chance of detection and reduce the 
likelihood of elimination or blocking by access points, 
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firewalls or IDSs. Any such device could be looking into 
the contents of packet headers and discarding invalid ones. 
The forged CTS generated in our covert channel can be 
modified to include a valid destination MAC address that 
exists in the network in which we are operating and a valid 
checksum. The only deviation from a system generated frame 
is the PV field value. This can be seen in Figures 13 and 
14, where the first highlighted field of the frames, d6 and 
c7, respectively, represents the type, subtype and protocol 
version. By inspection we can see that a protocol version 2 
is present in Figure 13, indicating the transmission of a 
binary zero, in our covert channel, and a version 3 is 
present in Figure 14, signaling a binary one. 
The d6 and c7 values are the hexadecimal 
representation of the bits that comprise the first octet in 
the MAC header. From Table 2, d6 in Figure 13 is composed 
as follows: 
 
B0 B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6  B7 
0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 
 
PV=1   TYPE=Control    SUBTYPE=ACK  
 
By taking B7 as the most significant bit, we get 
11010110(bin)=d6(hex). The same process applies to the 




   
Figure 13.   Forged ACK structure. 
 
 
Figure 14.   Forged CTS structure. 
The ID field or duration field is set to zero in 
Figures 13 and 14. If the forged frame is an ACK sent by a 
non-QoS station and has the More Fragments flag set to 
zero, then this field is also zero. Otherwise, it has a 
non-zero value [6]. On the other hand, if the forged packet 
is a CTS, this field indicates how long the referred 
station in the destination address field has air time to 
transmit its data, while the remaining stations hold their 
transmissions during the same period. If this field is set 
to zero, there are no practical implications to the 
network. However, if this field contains a non-zero value, 
all the other stations will hold their transmissions for 
that amount of time. This could be the basis for a Denial 
of Service (DoS) attack [27]. 
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C. DETECTING AND DISABLING THE USE OF THE PROPOSED COVERT 
CHANNEL 
Once we are aware of the existence of a covert 
channel, it is relatively easy to protect against its 
unwanted use.  
In order to limit the use of the proposed covert 
channel or any of its derivatives that are built upon the 
same concept, we just have to monitor the PV field in the 
MAC header. If the PV field is different from zero (00), 
the packet is discarded. This blocking technique works 
regardless of the type of packet we forge, since all types 
of packets have the PV in common [6]. Notice that this 
blocking rule would only limit (not eliminate) the use of 
the channel. For example, the frame would be blocked by an 
AP, but any station in the range of the transmitting 
station would still “hear” this frame.  
In our experiments, since we recorded frames with PV 
values other than 00 but with an invalid CRC, we cannot 
infer whether or not the APs are filtering such frames. 
What we can conclude is that invalid frames with altered PV 
values exist in the network and that stations within the 
covert channel's range still “hear” such frames. 
Another aspect that could raise suspicion is the 
presence of a long sequence of frames of the same type to 
the same MAC address in a short period of time. Although we 
described a way to circumvent this effect, this is still 
something to consider and is worth analyzing.  
Yet another aspect that could trigger an alarm would 
be the anomalous increase of the network's traffic during 
our use of the covert channel. We will examine such a 
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scenario in Chapter IV, but spacing the transmission of the 
forged frames in time mitigates this effect. This, however, 
comes at a cost since the throughput decreases and the 
transmission period increases. 
In this chapter, we presented the results of traffic 
monitoring in an IEEE 802.11 wireless network and proposed 
a covert channel. The process of choosing the right frame 
to forge based on empirical results was explained. The CTS 
frame was chosen, and some considerations about the frame 
choice, its strengths and weaknesses were made. The basic 
premise of the proposed covert channel is to use the PV 
field in the MAC header for message transmission. Aspects 
related to the detectability and mitigation were also 
discussed. The test bed model used for the experiments and 
a description of the developed code and the analysis of 
experimental results is presented in the next chapter.  
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IV. EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS 
In this chapter, we analyze three parameters of our 
channel: stealthiness, error robustness, and throughput. 
The intent is to present the results of experiments 
conducted using a proof-of-concept covert channel program 
developed by the author. 
A. TEST BED 
For conducting tests, we used two laptops with the 
same hardware configuration, using a PCM 3COM 3CRPAG175 
with an Atheros chip AR5212 as the wireless network 
adapter. One laptop was used as transmitter (Station A) and 
the other one as passive monitor (Station B). Station A was 
running Backtrack4 as the operating system (OS) as well as 
some additional software described in Appendix A. Station B 
ran Windows XP SP2 and the monitoring program used was 
Airopeek NX, version 3.0.1 [28]. 
In Chapter II, we described the ultimate goal of this 
thesis as having two stations that are part of an 
infrastructure wireless network, communicating between them 
through a covert channel. Although the concept is fairly 
simple, the practical implementation is not. For that 
reason, and also due to time constraints, our approach for 
the practical tests consisted of having two stations 
located in the physical area of an infrastructure 802.11 
network but not connected to it, trading messages between 
them using the proposed covert channel. The setup used for 




Figure 15.   Network topology used in the experiments. 
B. CODE DESCRIPTION 
In order to implement the proposed covert channel, we 
developed the necessary code to forge, transmit, and 
receive frames. To provide error robustness, we used 
convolutional coding along with interleaving. 
Python [13] was the chosen programming language due to 
its simplicity, available libraries and extension modules 
that facilitated our task. For the OS, a Linux environment 
was elected as being more flexible, open source and GNU 
licensed. The chosen distribution was Backtrack4. Diverse 
documentation on this OS flavor can be found online. All 
the additional software (see Appendix A) is also under GNU 
licensing, so no proprietary software was used to implement 
the covert channel. 
In order to simplify the use of our covert channel, a 
graphical user interface was used. Since this is a proof-
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of-concept effort, implementation of a half-duplex chat 
room environment seemed reasonable to meet our objectives. 
This way, we made use of an open-source chat environment 
previously developed by Wolfman and Filth [29]. The visual 
interface is used almost unchanged; several internal 
routines and processes were extensively altered. Effort was 
put into making the program applicable to realistic 
application scenarios. A small description of the code 
follows. In our code we wrapped the covert channel in a 
friendly GUI, so it looks and operates as a basic chat 
console. 
The code is divided into three major processes running 
simultaneously in a virtual sense, meaning the processor 
alternates between all processes in a very small amount of 
time. This is crucial to the code performance; the code 
optimization was on our mind but did not take a high 
priority. Figure 16 is a simple representation of the major 
blocks constituting the final code. A main program is 
initiated, along with the loading of several libraries and 
definition of variables. One of the most important 
libraries is Scapy [30], a Python packet manipulation 
program that enabled us to listen and disassemble frames as 
well as forge our own frames. The GUI is built using 
Tkinter. A screen capture of the GUI is shown in Figure 17. 
The various menus and the welcome message are visible, as 
well as an example of a transmitted and a received message. 
The transmitted message is the first line, identified with 
user John, and the second line is the received message, 
identified with Eve. 
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Figure 16.   Flow chart of the covert channel code 
implementation. 
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Following the flow direction on Figure 16, we then 
move to Thread1, where we initiate the listening part of 
our program. Here we filter the frames of interest, 
identify the beginning and end of the covert communication, 
and write the resulting message to a log file after 
converting the recovered string of bits to ASCII 
characters. The routine responsible for converting the bits 
to characters and storing them to the log file is: 
 
def conv(bin2): 
 bl=[bin2[i:i+8] for i in range(0, len(bin2), 8)] 
 final='' 
 for z in range(0,len(bl)): 
  final2=chr(int(bl[z],2)) 
  final=final+final2 
 timestamp='('+"%.19s" % str(datetime.now())+') ' 
        user='Received message'+': ' 
        txt = timestamp+user+final+'\n' 
        f = open(file.name, 'arb',5) 




Thread2 corresponds to the transmitting part of the 
code. We continuously scan the log file, where all the 
keyboard inputs are saved, check for an update in the file; 
and if one is detected, we build our binary string, forge 
the frames, and transmit them. This way, all the received 
and transmitted messages are saved in the log file with a 
time stamp and identification of message originator. 
During the transmission period of time, we set an 
internal control flag to 1 in order to suspend the 
listening routine, thus avoid listening to our own 
transmission. 
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Finally, Thread3 handles possible discrepancies in the 
identification of the beginning and end of the covert 
communication. The other version 1 frames (with bad 
checksums) circulating in the network become noise to our 
version 1 frames forming the start and end delimiters. 
Thread3 is responsible for filtering out these unwanted 
frames. The Python code segment of Thread3 is: 
 
def treset(): 
 while True: 
  global magic 
  c=magic 
  tm.sleep(10) 
  if c-magic==0 and magic<5: 
   magic=0 
  
 
A complete listing of the code is provided in 
Appendix B. 
 
Figure 17.   Covert channel GUI screen capture. 
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C. RESULTS 
Frame traffic was recorded over operational wireless 
networks during week days in order to capture the real-
world scenarios. 
Three different scenarios were considered and tested. 
All scenarios consisted of transmitting similar messages 
during approximately the same time of day. The difference 
between the scenarios is the way the data was transmitted, 
since we varied the type of frames used and applied 
different error mitigation mechanisms. 
It is important to notice that Stations A and B were 
operating in the ad-hoc mode of operation, i.e., outside 
the infrastructure wireless network being monitored. As a 
result, the mechanisms in the 802.11 standard designed to 
minimize collisions are not entirely observed. CSMA/CA was 
still used since it is a built-in functionality of the 
wireless adapter. The stations transmit without any 
coordination from the access point.  This likely causes 
collisions, and thus frame losses, which are interpreted as 
errors for analysis purposes. 
There were two types of messages used during the 
tests. The first message was a classic steganographic 
sentence used during WWII by a German spy [31]: 
Apparently neutral's protest is thoroughly 
discounted and ignored. Isman hard hit. Blockade 
issue affects for pretext embargo on by-products, 
ejecting suets and vegetable oils. 
The sentence has a total of 1408 bytes. The second 
type of message sent is a 25,000-bit long sequence of 
binary 1s. 
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These messages were transmitted under three scenarios. 
In the first scenario, the messages were sent without any 
error control.  
A demonstration of the sentence transmission is 
presented now using the chat room GUI. The result of a 
correct reception of a message sent over the covert channel 
is shown in Example 1, and a totally unreadable message is 
shown in Example 2. Both messages were sent over a Scenario 
1 environment in channel 1 with no error correction. 
Example 1:  
(2011-03-04 01:43:52) Received message: Apparently neutral's 
protest is thoroughly discounted and ignored. Isman hard hit. 
Blockade issue affects for pretext embargo on by-produce, 
ejecting suets and vegetable oil. 
Example 2: 




Forward error correction  (FEC) is used to improve 
robustness of transmitted messages in the second scenario. 
The last scenario consisted of forward error correction and 
bit interleaving to further enhance robustness. 
1. Error Performance of the Covert Channel 
CTS frames are used to carry the message in the PV 
field. This yields a throughput of approximately one bit 
per transmitted frame. Actually, it is slightly less than 
one bit per frame, since we have an overhead of ten frames 
to mark the beginning and end of the transmission. Channels 
1 and 9 of the network were monitored for frame traffic. 
Before conducting the analysis, it is important to 
define what we considered to be an error. In this thesis, 
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an error is the loss of a payload (information) bit. If we 
send one payload bit per frame, then the loss of one frame 
corresponds to one error. The reception of malformed 
frames, with invalid checksum indicating bit flips, is 
classified as a lost frame in our analysis. 
a. Channel 1 
In Figure 18(a) we can see the profile of the 
traffic collected for a period of about ten hours on 
channel 1. The percentage of errors detected upon reception 
of the test sentence is displayed in Figure 18(b). Finally, 
the percentages of errors recorded for the 25,000 long bit 
sequence of binary 1s is illustrated in Figure 18(c). The 
plots are time aligned. The width of the bars in Figures 
18(b) and 18(c) indicate the time it takes to transmit the 
complete sequence.  
Summarizing this analysis, we observed an average 
error of approximately 3% for the sentence and 2% for the 
sequence of ones over a total of 30 sets of transmissions. 
One desirable characteristic we want to preserve 
in a covert channel is the stealthiness of message 
transmission; that is, we try to hide as much as possible 
such that the use of the covert channel remains unnoticed. 
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Figure 18.   Network traffic profile and percentage of 
errors for sentence and sequence receptions in 
channel 1. 
Figure 19 is a partial magnification of the 
traffic profile shown in Figure 18(a), where the black 
(lower) line represents the normal network traffic, and the 
red (upper) line shows the normal traffic plus the traffic 
due to covert (forged) frames. As we can see in Figure 19, 
the difference between the red line and the black line 
corresponds to the amount of traffic added by the use of 
the covert channel. Since the network traffic is fairly 
heavy in channel 1, the presence of the covert channel is 








Figure 19.   A selected portion of network traffic 
profile for channel 1. 
b. Channel 9 
We repeated the same experiment using channel 9 
instead of channel 1. Here, we did not expect any heavy 
traffic; thus, no significant information is gained 
regarding traffic profile shaped by users. For that reason 
we reduced the sequence of ones from 25,000 to 2,500 bits 
in order to have a large number of sequences in a shorter 
amount of time. The results in Figure 20 correspond to a 




Figure 20.   Network traffic profile of channel 9. 
The results of the traffic profile with covert 
channel activity are shown in Figures 21 and 22. Figure 
21(a) is the graphical representation of the number of 
frames per second in circulation in the network between 9AM 
and 7PM on a weekday. The percentage of errors in the 
sentence reception is shown in Figure 21(b). In Figure 
21(c) we have the representation of the percentage of 
errors for the 2,500 bit long sequence.  
A zoomed in view of the normal traffic in the 
network versus the covert channel traffic is displayed in 
Figure 22. In this case the difference is large, and the 
presence of the channel is easily revealed. The red line 
represents the traffic due to the covert channel, whereas 
the black line is the normal traffic in the network. This 




Figure 21.   Network traffic profile and percentage of 
errors for sentence and sequence receptions in 
channel 9. 
The stealthiness of the channel can be improved 
by spacing the transmission of forged frames. How the 
covert traffic can be made less visible by introducing 
spacing between frames is illustrated in Figure 23. This of 
course reduces the throughput. Segment (a) in Figure 23 
corresponds to normal frame transmission with no additional 
spacing between the frames. For this segment the total 
transmission time was approximately two minutes at an 
average of 30 frames per second (fps). In segment (b) 
frames are sent once every two seconds, resulting in a 







segment (c) is shown only partially; we sent one frame 




Figure 22.   A selected portion of network traffic 
profile for channel 9. 
 
Figure 23.   Zoom of network traffic profile for channel 






The important aspect is that the difference 
between the legitimate and covert traffic becomes smaller 
and smaller as the spacing increases; at some point, it is 
possible to make it almost invisible as we extend the 
spacing. On the other hand, the throughput is degrading 
proportionately. 
Another technique to camouflage our use of the 
covert channel is to space the forged frames transmission 
in a non-uniform way instead of sending the frames at 
regular time intervals. Although considered, this variation 
was not tested. 
2. Error Performance of the Covert Channel With 
Forward Error Correction 
We now introduce forward error correction in order to 
reduce the number of errors in the covert channel. 
There are several options for implementing FEC: block 
codes such as Hamming and Reed-Solomon, convolutional 
codes, turbo codes, or low density parity check codes. In 
this thesis, a convolutional code was used for error 
correction. 
A convolutional encoder takes an m -bit message and 
encodes it into an n-bit symbol. The ratio m
n
 is the code 
rate. In our case a code rate of 23 was used, meaning the 
encoded message will be one and a half times as long as the 
original message. This increases the time needed to 
transmit the same message as before since a larger number 
of channel bits is being sent. 
Another important parameter in convolutional coding is 
the constraint length. This parameter,k , represents the 
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number of bits in the encoder memory that affect the 
generation of the n output bits [32]. A constraint length 
of four is used for our experiments. 
In order to deal with the presence of burst errors in 
the channel, in association with the convolutional coder we 
also used bit interleaving [33,34]. This consisted of 
breaking the coded message in blocks of eight bits and 
building a matrix with each block in a different row. By 
reading the matrix out by column, from top to bottom, we 
generate a new string of bits, effectively interleaving all 
the eight bit blocks.  The number of rows depends on the 
length of the message we are transmitting. This process is 
shown in Figure 24. 
 
 
Figure 24.   Bit interleaving process. 
Forward error correction is typically applied to a 
transmission of a stream of bits sent and received 
sequentially. In our case, however, the bits are embedded 
into independent frames, which are prone to loss. As a 
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result, when a frame is lost, the receiver has no 
indication that a bit was missing. Consequently, we now 
need to know exactly which frames were lost in order to 
apply the FEC correctly. Different approaches were tested, 
and the results are reported below.  
a. Alternating CTS and ACK 
A rudimentary mechanism for determining the 
location of the lost frames can be implemented by 
alternating the frame type, accomplished by sending 
alternate ACKs and CTSs. Essentially, we are using the 
subtype field in the MAC header to accomplish this; the PV 
field is still the carrier of the covert information. 
This approach effectively emulates a 1-bit 
sequence number. As soon as we lose more than one frame in 
a row, the entire sequence is corrupted, and the error 
correction scheme is unable to correct the errors (lost 
frames). A better scheme is needed.  
b. Alternating CTS and ACK Using Sequence 
Numbers 
We propose to use the eight flag bits in the 
frame control field of the MAC header to obtain a longer 
sequence number, which makes determining the location of 
lost frames an easier task. However, it is important to 
state that applying this use of the flag bits will increase 
the probability of detection of the covert channel since 
unexpected flag attributions will be present. This was not 
further investigated, but we are aware of the increased 
risk of detection taken when pursuing an increase in the 
channel’s error performance. In order not to use the flag 
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bits, one could use the type and subtype fields of the MAC 
header. As shown in Table 2, the IEEE802.11 standard 
defines some bit combinations of the subtype field as 
“Reserved.” Exploring these combinations could be an 
option; although, we did not test it. 
Figure 25 is a representation of how we 
accommodated the information and sequence bits within the 
MAC header. The blue squares represent our covert channel 
bits. These bits are used in the same way described in 
Chapter III: the first bit (B0) signals the presence of the 
channel and the second is payload (B1). The red circles 
refer to the sequence bits, which are placed in the flag 
bits of the frame control field. Given that we have eight 
flags, this gives us a total of 256 possible sequence 
numbers. This alone provides a reasonable amount of 
protection against a long burst of frame losses when 
compared to the previous approach.  
 
Figure 25.   Representation of the frame structure using 
the flag bits for sequencing. 
Figure 26 is an illustration of Wireshark capture 
of part of the transmission sequence of the sentence. 
Looking at the flag field, we can see how the hexadecimal 
values are increasing sequentially. 
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Figure 26.   Wireshark capture of transmitted forged ACK 
and CTS frames using flag bits for sequencing. 
This way of using the flag bits does not affect 
the traffic profile in the network since the number of 
forged frames is still the same. 
The percentage of errors as a function of 15 
repeated transmissions of the sentence in channel 1 over a 
period of four hours is shown in Figure 27. The length of 
the transmitted sentence is now 2,112 bits long because we 
applied a 23 rate encoder on a 1,408-bit string. The red 
stems (x) represent the number of errors detected in the 
received sentence, and the blue stems (o) the number of 
errors in the received sentence with FEC. In most cases the 
number of errors drops to zero or is significantly reduced. 
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Figure 27.   Percentage of errors before (red) and after 
FEC (blue) per received sentence, using flag bits 
for sequencing. 
This is consistent with our expectations. We have one 
outlier in that for the 13th repetition of the sentence we 
got a larger number of errors with FEC.  
We recorded a total of 67 errors in this 
experiment (without FEC), which translates into an average 
of 4.5 errors per sentence, or an average error percentage 
of 0.21%. After the execution of FEC, the total number of 
errors dropped to 21, resulting in an average of 1.4 errors 
per sentence, or an overall average of 0.09% relative to 
the 1,408 bits of the original message. This was an 
improvement of more than two-fold. However, this gain was 
the direct result of having to transmit more bits to send 
the same message when compared to the first scenario with 
no FEC, thus reducing the data rate. 
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The next test used the sequence of ones. The 
original length of 25,000 bits becomes 37,500 bits long 
after encoding. The error values for the 15 repetitions of 
the bit sequence are presented in Figure 28. Notice that 
the scale on the y-axis is different from that in Figure 27 
since larger values were plotted. The two largest values, 
corresponding to sequence numbers 3 and 4, are most likely 
the result of losing synchronization during the decoding of 
the bit string, leading to an uncontrolled increase in the 
number of errors. Recall that if the correct frame sequence 
is lost, the rest of the binary string is corrupted. An 
example of such an event is the loss of the marker that 
indicates the beginning and end of the channel use, the PV 
1 values. 
 
Figure 28.   Percentage of errors before (red) and after 
FEC (blue) per received sequence, using flag bits 
for sequencing. 
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Excluding the outliers, the total amount of 
errors at the receiver for the remaining 13 sequences was 
4,211. This gives us an average of approximately 324 errors 
per repetition, or 0.86% of the total 37,500 bits 
transmitted per sequence. After the FEC, the total number 
of errors dropped to 2,502, or 0.77% relative to the 
original 25,000 bit long sequence. 
3. Error Performance of the Covert Channel With 
Forward Error Correction and Interleaving 
In this scenario, we continued to use alternating 
sequences of CTS and ACK frames as well as FEC. We now 
consider sending more than one bit of information per 
forged frame. The proposed structure is illustrated in 
Figure 29. The blue squares indicate payload bits, and the 
red circles are sequence numbers. The green diamond (B0) 
indicates the presence of the covert channel. Bits B1, B8 
and B9 form the sequence number yielding a sequence length 




Figure 29.   Representation of the frame structure using 
three bits for sequencing and six bits for payload. 
Since each frame now carries six information bits, the 
loss of one or more frames has a bigger impact on the 
number of errors in the channel. In order to mitigate this 
effect, we interleave the bit string resulting from the 
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convolutional coder. Figure 30 is a schematic 
representation of this idea. At the output of the 
convolutional coder, we interleave the bits in groups of 
eight bits, as shown in Figure 24. This results in a new 
string of zeros and ones which goes into the covert channel 
processing block. Here the string is separated in groups of 




Figure 30.   FEC and interleaving block diagram. 
Notice that only information bits are encoded and 
interleaved; in this implementation the convolutional coder 
is applied after we have the complete message we want to 
transmit. In other words, first we capture the entire 
message, then we encode it, interleave it, and finally run 
the resulting string through the covert channel. The frame 
is forged as follows: six information bits are placed in 
the selected flag bits, three other bits are used for 
sequence numbers, and the first PV bit is set to one, 
indicating the use of the covert channel. 
Figure 31 is a display of a Wireshark capture of some 
transmitted frames. Notice how the flag values of 
successive frames change in a non-sequential way since 
every forged frame has different contents for these fields. 
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Figure 31.   Wireshark capture of transmitted forged ACK 
and CTS frames using three bits for sequencing and 
six bits for payload. 
a. FEC Without Interleaving 
We first test the channel using FEC and no 
interleaving. The error values for the 15 repetitions of 
the sentence are depicted in Figure 32. The average number 
of errors per repetition was 85, or 0.27%, of the total 
amount of bits sent per sentence. After tracking the 
sequence numbers and correcting the bit sequence, the final 
number of errors was reduced to 35 or 0.16%. 
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Figure 32.   Percentage of errors before (red) and after 
FEC (blue) per received sentence without 
interleaving. 
b. FEC With Interleaving 
In this experiment, we use three bits for 
sequencing. For a payload of six bits, the loss of one 
packet has a bigger effect in the error performance of the 
channel. For this reason we resorted to the use of 
interleaving.  
The percentage of errors per sentence repetition 
can be seen in Figure 33. From this figure we notice an 
outlier at repetition 12, actually gaining errors after the 
FEC. This was an isolated event and was excluded from this 
analysis. The result is an average number of 1.53 errors 
per repetition, or 0.07%, of the total amount of bits sent 
per sentence. Following the sequence number tracking, de-
 60
interleaving and correcting the bit sequence, we see that 
the total number of errors is reduced to zero. These are 
significant results; however, the sample space is small, 
and we cannot conclude that this level of robustness will 
be achieved in every reception. 
 
Figure 33.   Percentage of errors before (red) and after 
FEC (blue) per received sentence with interleaving. 
D. THROUGHPUT ANALYSIS 
In order to evaluate the throughput offered in each 
scenario, the rate at which the frames were transmitted was 
measured. This was done using Airopeek [28] and by 
averaging the rate of the forged frames on a per second 
(fps) basis.  The measured transmission rates may have 
large variations and may reach zero in some cases because 
sometimes no frame is sent during an entire second. 
Depending on the network usage at the time, the frame rate 
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varies significantly. Another factor responsible for this 
variation is the continuous adjustment of the maximum data 
rate of the network as dictated by the channel conditions. 
For IEEE 802.11b networks, the maximum network data rate 
possible values are 1, 2, 5.5, and 11 Mbps [6].  
To obtain a benchmark for performance comparison, we 
first determine the maximum data rate possible for the 
covert channel under optimal conditions. The conditions we 
assume are: 
1. The channel is ideal with no errors; 
2. There is only one station with frames to 
transmit; 
3. We use a data rate of 2 Mbps, the highest 
possible for 802.11b control frames (basic rate 
set) [6]. 
The medium access scheme has to obey some 
predetermined timing constraints set by the standard. 
Figure 34 is a graphical representation of the timing 
requirements for transmitting a frame. 
 
Figure 34.   Timing constraints in an 802.11 frame 
transmission [After 35] 
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Applying the work of Xiao and Rosdhal [36] and Jun et 
al. [37] to the proposed covert channel, the minimum amount 
of time necessary to transmit a forged CTS mint  can be 
expressed as 
   min 2
cwin slot
SIFS CTS




where SIFSt  is the short interframe time, 
  6
14 8 10.1811 10CTSt  µs is the transmission time of the 14-
byte CTS frame, cwinN  is the maximum size of the contention 
window, and slott  is the slot time.  
From the standard we use SIFSt 10 µs, cwinN 31 and 
slott 20 µs. This yields mint 376 µs, corresponding to a 
maximum of 2659 forged frames per second. At one bit per 
frame, the maximum bit rate is 2659 bps; at six bits per 
frame, we get 15.954 kbps. The measured throughput values, 
however, are significantly smaller. 
Having established a benchmark, we now determine the 
experimental throughput results. In the first experiment, 
we were able to transmit one bit of information in each 
forged frame, but we have the overhead of the start and end 
delimiters, a total of ten signaling frames. The measured 
average frame rate was 61 frames per second. Since each 
frame represents a bit, and considering our message payload 
of 1408 bits, we transmit a total of 1418 bits. At 61 fps 
this corresponds to a total transmission time of 23.25 sec 
and a useful bit rate or throughput of 60.5 bits per second 
(bps).  
The next experiment introduced FEC, and although we 
did not change the frame construction, the measured average 
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frame rate is smaller. This is due to the additional 
processing introduced with the sequencing of the frames. 
Instead of the previous 61 fps, we now have 43 fps being 
transmitted. Also, the total number of bits needed to send 
the message increases to 2122 due to the use of the 
convolutional coder. This corresponds to a total 
transmission time of 49.4 seconds, yielding a useful 
throughput of 21.3 bps. 
In the last experiment, we transmitted six bits per 
forged frame and introduced the use of interleaving. The 
measured average transmission rate was 32 fps, and 
transmitting the same 2122 bits as before, we obtain a 
total transmission time of 11 seconds. The resulting 
throughput value is 127.4 bps. The measured results are 
summarized in Table 6. 
Table 6. Measured throughput values compared to the 
channel data rate 
 
Useful bit rate 
(bps) 
Max. bit rate 
(Theoretical) 2659 
Without FEC and 
1 bit payload 60.5 
With FEC and I 
bit payload 21.3 
With FEC and 6 
bit payload 127.4 
 
In summary, results of testing the proposed covert 
channel were presented in this chapter. The Python code 
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used to implement the covert channel was briefly described. 
Results of experiments were presented, with emphasis on 
robustness to errors, channel covertness and achieved 
throughput. A summary of the conclusions made in previous 
chapters, significant results and recommendations for 
future work are given in the next chapter. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS  
The IEEE 802.11-2007 standard was the subject of our 
work in this thesis. This standard was first introduced in 
1997, yet it is still expanding and is one of the most 
widely used wireless networking standards. According to an 
industry report, in 2012 over a billion devices will be 
shipped with technology based on this standard onboard and 
the number is projected to be over two billion in 2014 
[38]. For this reason, we think it is important to evaluate 
the possible weaknesses and vulnerabilities in order to 
determine relevant security challenges. The particular 
focus in this work is covert channels, which have the 
characteristic of being hard to detect unless we know in 
advance what we are looking for. Consequently, continuous 
research and investigation in this field are essential. 
A previously undocumented 802.11 covert channel was 
implemented and tested in this thesis. We introduced and 
discussed the basic concept of the proposed covert channel. 
We then implemented the channel in a Linux environment and 
tested it under different scenarios in order to analyze its 
robustness, covertness and throughput. The necessary code 
to implement the channel and a GUI were developed in 
Python. The results of the experiments were presented and 
discussed. Considerable effort and resources were put into 
the development of the code, collection of the network 
frame traffic, and analysis of a large quantity of recorded 
network traffic. 
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A. SIGNIFICANT RESULTS 
A new covert channel in wireless networks based on the 
802.11 standard was identified. We used the protocol 
version field in the MAC header to hide and transfer the 
covert information. 
The proposed covert channel was implemented by 
developing the necessary code in Python. A GUI chat console 
is used for message transmission. The test bed used for 
experiments operated in a Linux environment. 
Robustness to errors in the covert channel was 
improved by the use of forward error correction and bit 
interleaving. Preliminary results indicate significant 
improvement in the error performance of the channel. 
The achieved throughput of the covert channel was 
measured under three scenarios. The maximum channel data 
rate is also determined. The case of a 6-bit payload along 
with convolutional coding and interleaving yielded the 
highest measured throughput. 
B. FUTURE WORK 
There are several aspects in which this work can be 
complemented and improved. One aspect to be potentially 
explored is to test whether the covert channel can be 
detected by APs. This would expand the characterization of 
the channel, providing a better understanding of its range 
of features. 
On the structural side of the proposed channel, other 




implemented. Not only the ones directly assigned by the 
standard, but also the set of types and subtypes classified 
as reserved (see Table 2). 
A further study of error performance would also be 
beneficial. One can conduct a larger range of tests under 
different scenarios, including experimenting in a 
controlled environment where the noise level and frame 
collision rates can be monitored. The possibility of using 
other error correction mechanisms is also of interest. 
Possible techniques include the use of a repetition code, 
where the frames are sent a fixed number of times. Knowing 
the number of repetitions and comparing the expected number 
to the actual number of received frames would allow us to 
find the location of lost frames. A spreading code would 
work in a similar way, but occasionally the bit values are 
inverted. 
In this work, we only used one wireless network 
adapter. Future research should consider the possibility of 
having two wireless network adapters installed in each 
station in order to explore the scenario described in 
Chapter II, where the stations are part of an 
infrastructure network while simultaneously using the 
covert channel. 
A future effort should consider the extension of the 
concept behind the proposed covert channel to wireless 
networks based on other standards, such as IEEE 802.16 
(WiMAX)[39] or Long Term Evolution (LTE)[40]. 
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APPENDIX A 
The necessary steps taken to execute the developed 
software and implement the proposed covert channel are 
described in this Appendix. 
We started by installing a fresh copy of the 
Backtrack4 Linux distribution on the stations. Once the 
installation was complete, we updated it by executing the 
following commands: 
 apt-get update 
 apt-get upgrade && apt-get autoclean 
 
This action downloaded and installed all the available 
updates and cleaned the unnecessary installation files.  
Now we disable the wireless interface ath1 in order to 
reinstall drivers that are compatible with our needs for 
raw packet injection. To do that, we execute: 
 ifconfig ath1 down 
 svn –r 4073 checkout http://svn.madwifi-
project.org/madwifi/trunk/ madwifi-ng 
 cd madwifi-ng 
 wget http://patches.aircrack-ng.org/madwifi-ng–
r4073.patch 
 patch –N –p 1 –I madwifi-ng-r4073.patch 
 ./scripts/madwifi –unload 
 make 
 make install 
 
This loads and sets the madwifi drivers as the interface 
drivers.  
We now need to blacklist the old drivers, so only the 
new ones are loaded. This is accomplished by: 
 go to /etc/modprobe.d/blacklist 
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 edit the file and add this line at the end: 
blacklist ath5k 
 reboot 
After rebooting the machine, we logon as root, start 
the GUI by executing: 
 startx 
and initialize the wireless adapter in the following way: 
 modprobe ath_pci 
 airmon-ng stop ath0 
 airmon-ng start wifi0 
 aireplay-ng -9 ath0 (to test the injection capability) 
 
Now the machine is almost ready to run our code, but 
some additional software is still needed. The Python 
version used in this thesis was 2.5.2 [13]. Also, Psycho 
1.6 [41] was installed in order to speed up the execution 
of the Python code. We also installed Scapy version 2.1.0 
[27] to enable frame forging. To have the ability to 
generate PDF files of the captured packets using Scapy 
(e.g., Figures 13 and 14), we execute the following 
commands: 
 apt-get install tcpdump graphviz imagemagick 
python-gnuplot python-crypto python-pyx  






#This program implements a covert channel by forging and transmitting # 
#control frames in 802.11 networks. It was written using the previous work # 
#of Wolfman and Filth for the graphical interface and reception routine. # 
#The forging and transmission routines are original work of Ricardo  # 
#Goncalves, as part of the requirements for MSCEE degree at NPS, CA, USA. # 
#March2011         # 
############################################################################ 
 
from __future__ import with_statement # MUST remain at the beginning of the file 
import time as tm # used to avoid 100% cpu usage 
from Tkinter import * # for the main portion of the program 
import threading # to allow simultaneous reading/writing 
from datetime import datetime, date, time # for timestamping save file and program output 
from tkFileDialog   import askopenfilename, asksaveasfilename # open/save dialogs 
import sys # to ensure proper termination 
from socket import * #enables the use of sockets 
from scapy.all import sniff,Dot11 #loads scapy and the necessary tools to sniff packets 
import pylorcon  











# set the default name for the archive file, which holds the conversations. 
class file: 
    name='covert.txt' 
 
# now we try to open it, and create it with some default text if it dosent exist 
try: 
    f = open(file.name, 'r+b') 
except IOError: 
    f = open(file.name, 'wb') 
    f.write('''                                                       
  ,ad8888ba,    ,ad8888ba,   I8,        8        ,8I   
 d8"'    `"8b  d8"'    `"8b  `8b       d8b       d8'   
d8'           d8'             "8,     ,8"8,     ,8"    
88            88               Y8     8P Y8     8P     
88            88               `8b   d8' `8b   d8'     
Y8,           Y8,               `8a a8'   `8a a8'      
 Y8a.    .a8P  Y8a.    .a8P      `8a8'     `8a8'       
  `"Y8888Y"'    `"Y8888Y"'        `8'       `8'        
                                                      (2011) 
-----------------------------//----------------------------- 
''') 
    f.close() 
finally: 
    f.close() 
 
######################################################################## 
# open the user file...or create it 
try: 
    f = open('.user', 'r+b') 
except IOError: 
    f = open('.user', 'wb') 
    f.write('Tony') # set your own default here if the file doesnt exist... 
    f.close() 
finally: 
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    f.close() 
# define that we want the user in the program to come from the file 
class who: 
    u=open('.user').read() 
 
######################################################################## 
# begin menubar functions 
def openf(): 
    choice=askopenfilename() 
    file.name=choice 
    #print 'open dialog returned '+choice 
    # this can be uncommented for testing proper execution of file dialog 
 
def save(): 
    n='CCW covert channel v1 '+"%.16s" % str(datetime.now())+'.txt' 
    save=asksaveasfilename(initialfile=n) # this is quite straitforward... 
    with open(file.name) as f: 
        g=open(save, 'wb') 
        for line in f.readlines(): 
            g.write(line) # it copies the file line by line 
    #print 'saved file at '+save 
    # much like the other dialog, this can be uncommented for testing 
 
def exit(): 
    sys.exit(0) 
 
# you can change the display name as you wish...it will be saved 
def name(): 
    root=Tk() 
    root.config(bg='black') 
    l=Label(root, text='Please enter your name below') 
    l.config(bg='black', fg='red', bd=0) 
    l.pack(side=TOP) 
    name=Entry(root) 
    name.config(width=14, bg='black', fg='red', insertbackground='red', bd=0, 
highlightbackground='red') 
    name.insert(INSERT, str(who.u).strip('\n')) 
    name.pack(side=BOTTOM) 
    def save(s): 
        who.u=name.get().strip('\n') 
        with open('.user', 'wb') as f: 
            f.write(who.u) 
        root.destroy() 
    name.bind('<Return>', save) 
 
# help menus are always useful...this one will be too, when i get around to making it 
def help(): 
    win=Tk() 
    win.config(bg='black') 
    win.title('About') 
    say=Text(win) 
    say.insert(0.0, ''' 
  ,ad8888ba,    ,ad8888ba,   I8,        8        ,8I   
 d8"'    `"8b  d8"'    `"8b  `8b       d8b       d8'   
d8'           d8'             "8,     ,8"8,     ,8"    
88            88               Y8     8P Y8     8P     
88            88               `8b   d8' `8b   d8'     
Y8,           Y8,               `8a a8'   `8a a8'      
 Y8a.    .a8P  Y8a.    .a8P      `8a8'     `8a8'       
  `"Y8888Y"'    `"Y8888Y"'        `8'       `8'        
                                                      (2011) 
-----------------------------//----------------------------- 
 
All Python documentation can be found online. 
All documentation for this program is within the code that comprises the program and 
simple text editor may be used to view it. 
Additional insight to this code is provided in the thesis document. 




    say.config(bg='black', fg='red', state=DISABLED) 
    say.tag_add('tag', 0.0, END) 
    say.tag_config('tag', justify=CENTER, wrap=WORD) 
    say.pack() 




# begin GUI definition ################################################# 
######################################################################## 










 bl=[bin2[i:i+8] for i in range(0, len(bin2), 8)] 
 final='' 
 for z in range(0,len(bl)): 
  final2=chr(int(bl[z],2)) 
  final=final+final2 
 timestamp='('+"%.19s" % str(datetime.now())+') ' # prepares a timestamp 
        user='Received message'+': ' # prepares username 
        txt = timestamp+user+final+'\n' # adds it all together with a newline 
        f = open(file.name, 'arb',5) # opens file 
        f.write(txt) # writes text 
 f.close() # closes file  
    
#sniff received frames   
def sniffack(p): 
 global magic, d,bin2, sending 
 if sending==0: 
  d=p.sprintf("[%Dot11.proto%]") 
  if d=="[1L]": 
   magic=magic+1 
   print magic 
  if magic>4: #loooks for the markers of the message 
   if p.sprintf("[%Dot11.proto%]")=="[2L]": 
    b="0" 
    bin2=bin2+b 
    print bin2 
   if p.sprintf("[%Dot11.proto%]")=="[3L]": 
    b="1" 
    bin2=bin2+b 
    print bin2 
   else: 
    pass 
  if magic>8: 
   print bin2 
   conv(bin2) 
   bin2="" 
   magic=0 
 else: 
  pass 
 
#transmit forged frames 
def sendpkt(packet): 
 global sending 
 sending=1 
 destination_addr='\x11\x0c\xf1\x0b\x7e\x1e'; 
 packet=packet + '\x00\x00' 









# begin main program 
class main: 
    def __init__(self, window): 
        window.title('NPS - Covert channel v1.0') 
        window.config(bg='black') 
        self.input() # main input 
        self.frame() # main display with scrollbar and copy ability 
        self.menu() # main menu at the top 
    def menu(m): 
        menu=Menu(window) 
        menu.config(bg='black', fg='red', activeforeground='black', 
activebackground='red') # gotta make it pretty 
######################################################################## 
        filemenu = Menu(menu, tearoff=0) # tearoff just adds a perforation-like look to 
the top of the menu 
        filemenu.config(bg='black', fg='red') 
        filemenu.add_command(label="Open...,” command=openf, activeforeground='black', 
activebackground='red') # gotta have commands for a decent menu 
        filemenu.add_command(label="Save...,” command=save, activeforeground='black', 
activebackground='red') 
 filemenu.add_command(label="Send file...,” command=sendfile, 
activeforeground='black', activebackground='red') 
        filemenu.add_separator() 
        filemenu.add_command(label="Exit,” command=exit, activeforeground='black', 
activebackground='red') 
        menu.add_cascade(label="File,” menu=filemenu) 
######################################################################## 
        editmenu = Menu(menu, tearoff=0) 
        editmenu.config(bg='black', fg='red', activeforeground='black', 
activebackground='red') 
        editmenu.add_command(label="Cut    Ctrl-X,” activeforeground='black', 
activebackground='red') 
        editmenu.add_command(label="Copy  Ctrl-C,” activeforeground='black', 
activebackground='red') 
        editmenu.add_command(label="Paste Ctrl-V,” activeforeground='black', 
activebackground='red') 
        editmenu.add_command(label="Name...,” command=name, activeforeground='black', 
activebackground='red') 
        menu.add_cascade(label="Edit,” menu=editmenu) 
######################################################################## 
        helpmenu = Menu(menu, tearoff=0) 
        helpmenu.config(bg='black', fg='red', activeforeground='black', 
activebackground='red') 
        helpmenu.add_command(label="About,” command=help, activeforeground='black', 
activebackground='red') 
        menu.add_cascade(label="Help,” menu=helpmenu) 
        window.config(menu=menu) 
######################################################################## 
    def input(i): 
        window.clipboard_append('') # make sure we have something in the clipboard 
        input=Text(window) # create input window 
        input.config(height=5, takefocus=1, bg='black', fg='red', insertbackground='red', 
bd=1, highlightcolor='red', highlightbackground='red') 
        # configure input window 
        # be able to write the conversation to the file 
        def writetext(t): 
            text = str(input.get(0.0, END)).strip('\n') # gets what you typed 
            timestamp='('+"%.19s" % str(datetime.now())+') ' # prepares a timestamp 
            user=who.u+': ' # prepares username 
            txt = timestamp+user+text+'\n' # adds it all together with a newline 
            f = open(file.name, 'arb',5) # opens file 
            f.write(txt) # writes text 
     f.close() # closes file 
     def b1(n): 
      return "01"[n%2] 
     def b2(n): 
      return b1(n>>1)+b1(n) 
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     def b3(n): 
      return b2(n>>2)+b2(n) 
     def b4(n): 
      return b3(n>>4)+b3(n) 
     bytes = [ b4(n) for n in range(256)] 
     def binstring(s): 
      return ''.join(bytes[ord(c)] for c in s) 
     p=binstring(text) 
  # read one bit at a time 
     r=len(p) 
     for a in range(r): 
      if a==0: 
       for b in range(5): 
        packet='\xc5\00' #'\xd5\00' 
        sendpkt(packet) 
      else: 
       pass 
      b=p[a] 
      if b=="1": 
       packet='\xc7\00' 
      else: 
       packet='\xc6\00' 
      sendpkt(packet) 
      if a==r-1: 
       for b in range(5): 
        packet='\xc5\00' 
        sendpkt(packet) 
      else: 
       pass 
            input.delete(0.0, END)# clears input area 
            return 'break' # makes sure the newline dosent get put in afterwards... 
             
        # event handlers!...basic cut/copy/paste support 
        # event handlers!...basic cut/copy/paste support 
        def copy1(c): 
            try: 
                window.clipboard_clear() 
                window.clipboard_append(input.get(SEL_FIRST, SEL_LAST)) 
            except TclError: 
                return 'break' 
                pass 
        def cut(c): 
            try: 
                window.clipboard_clear() 
                window.clipboard_append(input.get(SEL_FIRST, SEL_LAST)) 
                input.delete(SEL_FIRST, SEL_LAST) 
            except TclError: 
                #window.clipboard_append('') 
                return 'break' 
                pass 
        def paste(p): 
            try: 
                input.delete(SEL_FIRST, SEL_LAST) 
            except TclError: 
                window.clipboard_append('') 
                pass 
            finally: 
                input.insert(INSERT, window.selection_get(selection='CLIPBOARD')) 
        # event bindings... 
        input.bind('<Control-v>', paste) 
        input.bind('<Control-x>', cut) 
        input.bind('<Control-c>', copy1) 
        input.bind("<Key-Return>,” writetext) 
        input.pack(side=BOTTOM, fill=BOTH, expand=1) 
    def frame(f): 
            frame=Frame() 
            frame.pack(in_=window, fill=BOTH, expand=1) 
            T=Text(frame, wrap=WORD) # LOVE wordwrap...very good at formatting the 
display... 
            s=Scrollbar(frame) 
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            s.config(command=T.yview, bg='black', bd=0, highlightbackground='red', 
width=8, activebackground='#4e4e4e', trough='red') 
            T.config(yscrollcommand=s.set, bg='black', fg='red', bd=1, relief=FLAT, 
highlightbackground='red') 
            T.pack(in_=frame, side=LEFT, fill=BOTH, expand=1) 
            s.pack(in_=frame, side=RIGHT, fill=Y, expand=0) 
            # with ctrl-z, you can copy from the text output...i will be working on 
appending this 
            # functionality to the other copy function 
            def copy(c): 
                try: 
                    frame.clipboard_clear() 
                    frame.clipboard_append(T.get(SEL_FIRST, SEL_LAST)) 
                except TclError: 
                    frame.clipboard_append('') 
                    pass 
            # yes, you can access this function from anywhere within the window...not 
just the widget 
            window.bind('<Control-z>', copy) 
            # gotta be able to see things...monitors the file (specified earlier) and 
prints contents line by line as it changes 
            def outputtext(): 
                    choice=file.name 
                    with open(file.name, 'rb') as f: 
                        while 1: 
                            for line in f.readlines(): 
                                T.insert(END, line) 
                                T.see(END) 
                                if choice!=file.name: 
                                    continue 
                            # of you open another file, it will display whever is in it 
if it can be read 
                            else: 
                                if choice!=file.name: 
                                    T.delete(0.0, END) 
                                    choice=file.name 
                                    f=open(file.name, 'rb') 
                                    continue 
            # the output needs to be in it's own thread...i think...i will test this 
later... 
            thread2 = threading.Thread(target=outputtext) 
            thread2.start() 
     def rxtext(): 
  while True: 
   sniff(iface="ath0,” prn=sniffack) 
 
     thread = threading.Thread(target=rxtext) 
     thread.start() 
def treset(): 
 while True: 
  global magic 
  c=magic 
  tm.sleep(10) 
  if c-magic==0 and magic<5: 
   magic=0 
  
thread3 = threading.Thread(target=treset) 
thread3.start() 








# ensure that the program exits after the GUI loop has been terminated 
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